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It should be uncontentious that a rule of law crisis exists in Hungary. Indeed, one
might go as far as to suggest that in continuing to describe current conditions
as a ‘rule of law crisis’, commentators have acquired a rather British taste for
understatement. What persists in Hungary is a democratic crisis. If there was any
doubt, it became incontestable following the passage of the Enabling Act on the 30th
March. The consequences of that Act were explained in detail by Kovács; suffice it
to say, the Act allows the Prime Minister to rule by decree, suspends all elections
and referendums during the period of the declared emergency, and provides that it
is the Prime Minister who determines when that emergency ends. To all intents and
purposes, Orbán and his government have ceased to be democratically accountable
either to the Hungarian Parliament or to the citizens of Hungary. I choose the words
in that last sentence carefully, and the reason for this will become apparent below.
In this blogpost, I suggest that Article 10 TEU may provide a basis for the exclusion
of Hungarian representatives from the European Council and the Council of the
European Union (henceforth “Council”).
What to do about Hungary’s democratic crisis?
What should or can be done about Hungary’s serious and persistent breaches
of the EU’s core Article 2 TEU values has been a major problem for some years
now. The weaknesses of the arsenal provided by the EU Treaties to respond to a
Member State’s flagrant disregard of these values have been exposed: enforcement
of EU law and CJEU judgments ultimately relies upon the sincere cooperation of
the Member State, and the Article 7 TEU process is frustrated by the requirement
of unanimity to suspend voting rights. Additionally, responses have been hampered
by the reticence shown by political actors, especially the EPP, to confront Hungary
directly. Given the depth of the crisis in Hungary and the seriousness of the threat it
poses to the EU democratic and legal orders, imaginative solutions are required.
In a recent blog post, Hillion proffered the intriguing argument that Poland and
Hungary’s ongoing violation of the prerequisites of EU membership could amount
to a triggering of the Article 50 TEU process by those States, i.e. a notification of
a decision to withdraw from the EU. Hillion’s argument drew a number of retorts.
I argued that Hillion’s argument was doctrinally unsound and that it would have a
chaotic and counterproductive outcome. Scholtes maintained that Hillion’s argument
amounted to ‘legal fetishism’ and that the awkward truth is that a solution to the
Polish and Hungarian questions could not be found through legal sleights-of-hand.
Although I continue to agree with Scholtes, I maintain that while legal mechanisms
may not provide an answer by themselves, political actors or concerned individuals
exhibiting sufficient resolve could, with assistance from the CJEU, utilise legal
arguments to assert significant pressure on recalcitrant Member States such as
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Hungary. In this spirit, I make the tentative argument that Article 10(1) and (2) TEU
can be interpreted as excluding Hungarian representatives from the European
Council and the Council.
Article 10(1) and (2) TEU and excluding Hungarian
Representatives from the European Council and the
Council
Article 10(1) TEU provides: “The functioning of the Union shall be founded on
representative democracy.” (emphasis added). In addition, the second subparagraph
of Article 10(2) TEU provides: “Member States are represented in the European
Council by their Heads of State or Government and in the Council by their
governments, themselves democratically accountable either to their national
Parliaments, or to their citizens.” (emphasis added).
If one focusses on Article 10(2) TEU specifically, there are, of course, a number
of possible interpretations, especially when it is read together with other TEU
provisions. However, I would tentatively suggest the following understanding: in
order to represent a Member State in the European Council or the Council, a head
of state or government, in the case of the former, or a government, in the case of the
latter, must be “democratically accountable either to their national Parliaments, or to
their citizens.” In my view, this is a perfectly plausible and quite literal interpretation
of the provision. The logical consequence of such a reading is that the Hungarian
government is currently not entitled to partake in the work of the European Council
or Council. This is because Orbán’s government is currently unaccountable to the
Hungarian Parliament and Hungarian citizens, since Orbán rules by decree and
has suspended elections and referendums, possibly indefinitely. Furthermore, it
is arguable that any reviewable act concluded by a European Council or Council
formation containing Hungarian representatives while they are not entitled to partake
in those institutions is unlawful.
Responding to possible doctrinal objections to my
argument
Against the interpretation I offer above, it could be argued that the wording of the
TEU provisions relating to the composition of the European Council and Council
requires both institutions to consist of representatives of all Member States. Article
16(2) TEU, which relates to the Council, seems quite explicit in this regard: “The
Council shall consist of a representative of each Member State at ministerial level.”
In reply, it might be argued that this provision does not contradict Article 10(2) TEU,
which merely requires that these representatives be “democratically accountable” in
order to take their place in the Council.
Furthermore, one might argue that the procedure established in Article 7 TEU is
designed specifically to deal with Member State breaches of the core values of
the EU (including respect for democracy), and that this provision is lex specialis.
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This is certainly a strong argument. However, I would counter that Article 7 TEU is
designed for responses to breaches or dilutions of the democratic value; Article 10(2)
TEU suggests that when a Member State becomes completely authoritarian, as
Hungary has, its government ceases to meet the basic qualification in that provision
to partake in the European Council and Council.
It might also be argued per contra my assertion that the second subparagraph of is
merely descriptive and that in the absence of the Article 7 process being completed,
it should be assumed that all Member State governments are democratically
accountable. I would counter this by pointing to the exclusive role of the CJEU under
Article 19(1) TEU to “ensure in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the
law is observed”; as such, it would be open to the CJEU, particularly in light of its
Article 13(1) TEU duty to promote the values of the EU contained in Article 2 TEU,
to interpret the second subparagraph of Article 10(2) TEU purposively as a minimum
qualification requirement. Moreover, it would be within the jurisdiction of the CJEU
to interpret the meaning of the words “democratically accountable” and to review
whether a Member State government fulfilled this standard. As stated above, I do not
believe that the Hungarian government fulfils this requirement at present.
Pragmatic problems with my argument
Although I maintain that my interpretation of Article 10 TEU is, at the very least,
arguable, I can conceive of some pragmatic problems with my argument. A
significant issue, in the absence of political will among EU institutions and Member
State governments, would be engaging Article 10 TEU or litigating the question.
There would appear to be no basis for an argument that the European Council or
Council could take upon itself the decision to exclude government representatives
from a Member State in which the “democratically accountable” condition was not
fulfilled. For individuals litigating the matter (by contesting the legality of a reviewable
act, by alleging it was taken by the European Council or Council with Hungarian
government representation unlawfully partaking), the notoriously restrictive standing
rules in Article 263 TFEU could present a hurdle. Direct action on the question might
rely on the will of other Member States, the Commission or the European Parliament,
with the latter perhaps being the most likely to demonstrate willingness to do so. An
indirect challenge by an individual against an EU act in a national court, which could
necessitate a preliminary reference might be the most likely avenue to the CJEU.
The pragmatic consequences of such a use of Article 10(2) TEU must also be
considered. A successful argument that Hungarian representatives were not
qualified to partake in European Council or Council proceedings would necessitate
the CJEU having to make a difficult, though not impossible, assessment as to
when precisely Hungary ceased to be entitled to representation. A desire to avoid
wholesale nullification of acts taken by the European Council and Council would be
a consideration. Moreover, the question of when the Hungarian government would
once again be entitled to partake in European Council or Council proceedings would
be a matter for ongoing judicial supervision, something that would not be ideal.
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Possible Hungarian responses also have to be gamed into any potential use of
Article 10(2) TEU. Orbán’s government could regularly engage and disengage
legislation like the Enabling Act, thereby creating continual confusion over Hungary’s
status in the European Council and Council, and by extension the legality of
measures adopted by those institutions (a tactic that would require a response by
the CJEU). Moreover, the Hungarian government could engage in a public relations
war with the EU: elections or a referendum could be called in Hungary in an attempt
to underscore the government’s democratic accountability. Additionally, Hungarian
representatives might attempt to publicly defy the CJEU by attempting to attend
European Council or Council meetings, thereby possibly forcing security personnel
to take (legally questionable) steps to exclude them. Finally, my suggested use of
Article 10(2) TEU has a limitation in that it deals only with the current (and hopefully
temporary) absence of democratic accountability by Parliament and citizens, rather
than the wider problems of interference with independent courts.
Advantages of my argument
The problems described with my proposed interpretation and utilisation of Article
10(2) TEU in the preceding paragraphs are considerable. However, the proposal
also has much to recommend it as a last resort. First, I would argue that it is a
plausible argument doctrinally. Secondly, the exclusion of Hungarian government
representatives from the European Council and Council does not force the EU into
a potentially irreversible series of events. Additionally, it would be open to the CJEU
in a judgment to place strict preconditions for Hungary’s return to the European
Council and Council, which could then be used as leverage to ensure Hungary,
at least temporarily, takes measures to democratise. Thirdly, my suggestion does
not (at least directly) punish the citizens of Hungary, who would maintain their
representation in the European Parliament. Finally, with Hungarian representation
excluded from proceedings in the European Council and Council, the likelihood
of a successful Article 7 TEU process being concluded against Poland would be
increased significantly. With Poland’s voting rights suspended, attention could then
turn to utilising Article 7 TEU against Hungary on its re-admission to the European
Council and Council.
Conclusion
In closing, I would emphasise that I am making a tentative argument in this blogpost,
and one that is certainly not without its problems. Nevertheless, the path I have
suggested above could, in the absence of other means, provide an avenue through
which pressure could be applied to the Hungarian government to end its state of
emergency and reinstitute at least some measure of democratic accountability in the
event that it were to drag its feet. It might also, as suggested above, allow Hungary
and Poland to be isolated from one another and confronted separately via Article 7
TEU.
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